COSigna Privacy  Terms  DPA

Privacy Policy

How COSigna processes personal data — and how little of it ever reaches our servers.

Provisional draft v0.1 · 2026-06-06 · controller: Phileos · English working version (FR/DE to follow)

Contents
  1. Who we are (the controller)
  2. One-paragraph summary
  3. What data we process, and why
  4. Consent selfies — biometric special-category data (Art. 9)
  5. Legal bases
  6. The blind server & data minimisation
  7. Retention & the user-held permanent proof
  8. Your rights — and the exact endpoints that honour them
  9. Subprocessors
  10. International transfers
  11. Security measures
  12. Cookies & local storage
  13. DPIA status
  14. Contact & complaints (CNIL)
  15. Changes to this policy
  16. Communications & how we use your email

1. Who we are (the controller)

The data controller for your COSigna account and for the COSigna hosted service is Phileos, a company incorporated in France:

Legal namePhileos Security and Event Services (PSES)
SIRET937 831 899
RCSParis
Registered address60 Rue François 1er, 75008 PARIS
Contact / DPOprivacy@phileos.eu

Two different roles. When you use COSigna for your own purposes, Phileos is the controller of your account data. When a professional customer (for example, a law firm) runs ceremonies that process their signers' data, that customer is the controller and Phileos acts as a processor on their instructions — governed by our Data Processing Agreement (Art. 28 GDPR).

2. One-paragraph summary

COSigna is an asynchronous, multi-party electronic-signature "ceremony" built around a blind server: the original document never reaches us — only its content-addressed SHA-256 hash does. We process your account email, the document hashes, ceremony metadata, a self-declared location, your credit ledger, and — only with your explicit consent — an end-to-end-encrypted consent selfie that our server stores as ciphertext it cannot read. Payment card data is handled entirely by Stripe; we never see it. All personal data is hosted in the EU. You can export everything and erase it — including crypto-erasure of the encrypted selfie — using endpoints that are already built and described below.

3. What data we process, and why

DataWhyGDPR category
Account email addressTo create and secure your account; magic-link / passkey sign-in; service notices.Personal data (Art. 4)
Consent selfie (encrypted)The contemporaneous record that a human consented at the signing moment. Stored only as end-to-end-encrypted ciphertext.Special category — biometric (Art. 9)
Evidence attachments (encrypted)Files a signer chooses to attach as supporting evidence. The file's contents are stored only as end-to-end-encrypted ciphertext we cannot read. The file's name, size and type are stored in cleartext as metadata — we do not encrypt them today, and we say so rather than imply otherwise. Erased — ciphertext and metadata together — when the signer withdraws or is skipped.Personal data (Art. 4) — may be special-category (Art. 9) if the signer attaches an identity document
Document hashes (SHA-256)The content-addressed reference that lets every party verify they signed the same document. Not the document itself.Personal data (links an identity to a document)
Ceremony metadataWho the parties are, ceremony state and timestamps, the hash-chained attestations.Personal data
Self-declared locationA signer-entered statement of where they signed, recorded in the attestation. We do not capture GPS or EXIF.Personal data (self-declared)
Credit ledgerTo track the credits you hold and consume (perpetual, single-purpose vouchers).Personal data
Payment dataHandled by Stripe as payment processor. We receive a transaction reference and the credits to grant — never the card number.Personal data (held by Stripe)
IP address (transient)Used transiently for rate-limiting and abuse prevention. Not retained as a tracking or profiling record.Personal data (transient)
Signer↔account linkageRecords that your account signed a specific ceremony as a specific COSignee — captured only when you explicitly confirm the "Sign & link" prompt shown at the signing moment (you can decline and sign as a guest instead). Used only to address ceremony-status notifications to your account. Never read by any admin surface; you can see and erase it via your own export/erasure below.Personal data
Participant visibility in a transparent ceremonyWhen the organizer creates a ceremony as transparent (an explicit, create-time, unchangeable choice), every COSignee sees the other participants' names and signing status. A COSignee who has themselves signed additionally sees the end-to-end-encrypted consent photos of those who have already signed. Default is off.Personal data; the consent photos remain special category — biometric (Art. 9)
Capsule download countAn identifier-free aggregate count of how many times a ceremony's capsule (proof bundle) has been downloaded, shown only to that ceremony's own organizer as "N download(s)". No downloader identity, IP address, or per-download detail is ever exposed — the underlying log never records who downloaded.Not personal data (no identifier is ever stored or shown)

4. Consent selfies — biometric special-category data (Art. 9)

A consent selfie is a photograph of your face, taken at the signing moment to evidence that a real person — you — consented. We treat it as special-category biometric data under Article 9 GDPR and handle it accordingly:

Honest note for reviewers. Because the server holds only ciphertext, we believe the server does not "process" biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person in the Art. 9 sense. We flag this as a position to confirm with counsel rather than a settled certainty, and we treat the selfie as Art. 9 data regardless, applying the stricter regime by default.

5. Legal bases

ProcessingLegal basis (GDPR Art. 6 / 9)
The consent selfie (biometric)Explicit consent — Art. 9(2)(a), on top of Art. 6(1)(a).
The act of signing / participating in a ceremonyConsent (Art. 6(1)(a)) and/or contract (Art. 6(1)(b)) — you ask us to record your attestation.
Providing the service (account, ceremonies, credits)Contract — Art. 6(1)(b).
Security, anti-fraud, rate-limiting (transient IP)Legitimate interest — Art. 6(1)(f). We use the IP transiently to limit abuse; we do not build a tracking profile from it.
Retaining a closed ceremony as evidenceContract / legitimate interest, with the legal-claims grounds of Art. 17(3)(e) for the non-reversible proof record (see retention).

6. The blind server & data minimisation

COSigna is engineered for data minimisation at the architectural level (Art. 5(1)(c), Art. 25):

7. Retention & the user-held permanent proof

The distinction matters: the personal data you can erase (your encrypted selfie, your account) is separate from the non-reversible cryptographic proof (hashes and timestamps) that carries no personal content and that you hold independently of us.

8. Your rights — and the exact endpoints that honour them

Under GDPR you have the rights of access, portability, rectification, erasure, restriction, and objection. These are not promises on paper — they are built into the service:

RightArticleHow it worksEndpoint
Access / portability15 / 20A machine-readable export of your account and ceremony data. It excludes email addresses that COSignees supplied themselves — those are the COSignee's personal data, not yours, and Art. 15(4) provides that a copy must not adversely affect the rights of others. Addresses you entered when creating a ceremony are included, because you already hold them. Each COSignee can read and erase their own address at any time.GET /account/export
Access / erasure (COSignee contact)15 / 17A COSignee can read or erase the email address held for them in a ceremony, using their own signing link — no account needed. Erasing it stops the organizer's reminders and the completion email reaching them. We also erase it automatically within days of the ceremony closing.GET / DELETE /ceremonies/{id}/signers/{signer}/contact
Erasure (selfie)17Crypto-erasure of the encrypted consent selfie; the non-reversible hash commitment remains so the proof stays structurally verifiable.POST /faces/{hash}/erase
Erasure (account)17Account and sessions deleted; closed ceremonies are unlinked, with the evidentiary record retained under Art. 17(3)(e).POST /account/delete
Accountability5(2)Every erasure is recorded in an append-only, PII-free erasure_log.—
Storage limitation5(1)(e)Automatic expiry of draft/abandoned ceremonies after the retention window.retention sweep (COSIGNA_RETENTION_DAYS, default 90)

How to exercise them. You can use the in-app account controls, or contact privacy@phileos.eu. We will respond within one month (Art. 12(3)), extendable as permitted. We do not charge for the first request.

9. Subprocessors

We rely on a small, EU-anchored set of subprocessors. No document content ever leaves to any third party — the blind-server design makes that structurally impossible.

SubprocessorRoleLocationWhat it sees
ScalewayHosting + object storageFrance (EU)Encrypted/at-rest service data; selfie ciphertext (opaque); hashes. Never plaintext documents or selfies.
Stripe Payments EuropePayment processingIreland (EU)Card and billing data (we never receive the card number).
Scaleway TEMTransactional emailFrance (EU)Your email address + sign-in / service messages.
OpenTimestamps calendars + Bitcoin networkPublic timestamp anchoringPublic infrastructureHashes only — no personal data, no document content.

The current subprocessor list is also maintained in the DPA. Material changes are communicated as described there.

10. International transfers

Personal data is hosted and processed within the EU/EEA. We do not transfer your personal data outside the EU/EEA in the ordinary course. The OpenTimestamps/Bitcoin anchor is public infrastructure that carries only hashes — no personal data and no document content — so it does not constitute an international transfer of personal data. Should any transfer ever become necessary, we would put appropriate safeguards (such as Standard Contractual Clauses) in place first.

11. Security measures (Art. 32)

Honest note. An independent security assessment / penetration test is planned and not yet complete. We describe our measures accurately and do not claim certifications (e.g. ISO 27001, SOC 2) we do not hold.

12. Cookies & local storage

Minimal, and no third-party trackers. COSigna uses only first-party localStorage to remember your session and your language preference. There are no advertising cookies, no analytics trackers, and no third-party tracking pixels. This is a deliberate design choice.

Do Not Track and Global Privacy Control are honored. If your browser sends the DNT: 1 or Sec-GPC: 1 signal, COSigna excludes your visit from ALL of its first-party measurement — the anonymous feature-usage counters, the performance beacons, and even the identifier-free aggregate traffic and country-of-origin counts. We take the stricter reading: although these aggregates contain no identifier to opt out of, an opt-out signal means you are not counted at all.

13. DPIA status

Because COSigna processes data tied to legally significant acts together with a biometric consent artefact, a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA, Art. 35) is appropriate and is commissioned / in progress. We will reflect its conclusions here.

14. Contact & complaints (CNIL)

Questions, requests, or concerns: privacy@phileos.eu.

You also have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority. For Phileos (France) this is the CNIL (Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés), www.cnil.fr. You may also contact the authority in your own EU/EEA country of residence.

15. Changes to this policy

This is provisional draft v0.1. We will version every material change, date it, and — once the policy is finalised with counsel — give notice of significant changes. The version and date appear at the top of this page.

16. Communications & how we use your email

Provisional — pending Counsel review (CR-11). This section describes a proposed two-tier comms model that is not yet fully implemented. It will be confirmed, and the mechanism completed, before the first non-transactional email is sent.

Your email address is the only personal data we hold about you, and we use it as minimally as possible. Here is exactly what we do and do not do with it:

The honest data claim. Your email is the only personal data we keep, and only to send you the magic link to sign in (and these rare updates). We never see your documents, who you sign with, or what you sign — and we never sell, share, or profile your address.

Because email is our only way to reach you, we occasionally use it for important technical information. Opt out of updates and you will need to check the platform yourself for news.

How we categorise the emails we send

TierWhat it coversCan you opt out?Legal basis
Tier 0 — TransactionalThe magic-link sign-in email. Without it you cannot use the service.No — it is the service itself.Performance of contract (Art. 6(1)(b))
Tier 1 — Critical platformSecurity notices, data-breach notifications, service migrations, and similar messages required by law or by the GDPR Art. 33/34 breach-duty. Rare.No — we are required or obligated to send these.Legitimate interest + legal obligation (Art. 6(1)(c)/(f))
Tier 2 — Product updatesRelease notes, new-feature announcements, Alpha milestone emails. Occasional.Yes — one-click, no login required. Default-ON during Private Alpha; you can opt out at any time via the unsubscribe link in any such email.Legitimate interest (soft opt-in for existing platform users) (Art. 6(1)(f))

How to opt out of Tier-2 updates

Every Tier-2 email carries a one-click unsubscribe link in its footer. Clicking it:

If you opt out, you can still find product news by checking the platform directly.

COSigna — patent EP3665600B1 · US11531746B2 · FR3070079B1
Report bug COSigna — a Cryptographic Ring of Mutual Consent · The ring is strong because the loop is closed. The ring is strong because the loop is closed.